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viCo & the new sCienCe oF interpretation




The tendency among contemporary intellectual historians to project the prejudices of their own society onto their subjects is not always a reflection of unconscious conceit. A case in point is 
the problem one encounters when trying to fathom what Jules Michelet 
once famously referred to as the “petit pandemonium” of Giambattista 
Vico’s Scienza Nuova (Michelet 1843, 4-5).1 Finding meaningful coher-
ence in the often confusing architectonic of this baroque masterpiece 
has perforce compelled commentators to read into it the ideas of their 
own age. As Vico himself observed, “whenever men can form no idea of 
distant and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and 
at hand” (Vico 1968, par. 122-23). This “axiom” of interpretation, he 
believed, “points to the inexhaustible source of all the errors about the 
principles of humanity” evinced by the enlightened natural law theorists 
of his day, who sought to interpret the barbarian peoples of antiquity 
as if they were civilized philosophers (122-23).
Yet if we accept the argument advanced by Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(Gadamer 1993), the mediation of past and present that occurs when-
ever commentators judge the past from what is familiar at hand need 
not obstruct understanding and in fact may be necessary for it. The 
legitimate demand to understand an original thinker of Vico’s stature 
exactly as his contemporaries understood him—or as he understood 
himself—can at best be partially realized. For a literal replication of Vico’s 
understanding—replete with all its parochial anachronisms—would 
simply render him meaningless to contemporary readers. What Vico 
means by scienza and coscienza, to take one obvious example, does not 
1	 All references to Vico’s Scienza Nuova will be taken from the numbered 
paragraphs of The New Science of Giambattista Vico (Vico 1968).
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exactly correspond to the English expressions “science” and “knowledge.” 
The Italian words with their Latin roots imply a kind of familiarity 
that seems far removed from our more modern concept of a technical 
expertise. And then there is Vico’s own peculiar usage of these words, 
which recall Scholastic and Cartesian philosophical antecedents.
Given the futility of trying to understand him exactly as his contem-
poraries understood him, it is hardly surprising that contemporary 
commentators have interpreted Vico in light of the pressing issues 
confronting today’s philosophers and historians. Thus, in what has 
now become a standard tribute paid to Vico, Ernst Cassirer and, more 
recently, Isaiah Berlin have argued that Vico’s single greatest accom-
plishment was to have seen (however dimly) what later philosophers 
and historians writing over a century later would fully comprehend: 
that historical knowledge possesses an interpretative logic that is radi-
cally different from the causal-explanatory logic definitive of natural 
scientific knowledge.2 
 Assuming that Cassirer and Berlin are right, it is imperative that 
hermeneuticists who follow in the steps of Vico understand what kind 
of interpretative logic he may have had in mind. Vico refers to a kind 
of self-knowledge (reflessione) that is very different from the Cartesian 
inspection of the mind, conceived as a method for knowing physical 
nature (Vico 1968, par. 236). In his opinion, the only true knowledge 
we can obtain while “reflecting within the modifications of our very own 
mind” (dentro le modificazione della medisima nostra mente umana—par. 
331) is knowledge of the modifications of human nature, conceived as 
a relatively invariant process of historical evolution and devolution. 
Why does he say this? What is special about reflecting on the past 
that sets it apart from mathematical and conceptual reflection? Vico 
provides us with many clues about what he means by ‘mind’ (mente), 
‘reflection’ (reflessione), ‘common sense’ (sensus communis), ‘imagination 
(fantasia), and other terms he uses that have a bearing on our query. 
For his own part, Berlin thinks that the kind of ‘understanding’ (verste-
hen) we find in Vico is broadly equivalent to the kind of Empfindung 
and Nacherleben (sympathetic and imaginative identification with and 
2	 Ernst Cassirer, e.g., argued that “the real value in Vico’s ‘philosophy of history’ 
… and what he did see clearly, and what he defended against Descartes, was 
the methodological uniqueness and distinctive value of historical knowledge” 
(Cassirer 1960, 52). Cf. also Berlin 1976. 
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experiential reconstruction of ) cultural worldviews of the sort later 
expounded by Wilhelm Dilthey and other historicists.3
However promising this conjecture might be for answering our ques-
tion, Gadamer’s criticism of Berlin’s type of historicism suggests that 
Berlin might be mistaken. For if Gadamer is right, historicism tacitly 
invokes precisely the kind of Cartesian reflection that Vico himself re-
pudiates (Gadamer 1993, 187-91, 220-37). How then, can we reconcile 
Berlin’s interpretation of Vico—with its implication that Vico was an 
historicist avant la lettre and (accepting Gadamer’s view of historicism) 
a “closet” Cartesian—with the near universal opinion that Vico’s notion 
of historical understanding is un-Cartesian?
I argue that we cannot accept Berlin’s interpretation, and furthermore 
that Vico must have had in mind a different notion of verstehen pos-
sessing a different logic of reflection. The most obvious candidate for 
such an alternative notion of historical understanding is the dialecti-
cal (or rather, dialogical) one proposed by none other than Gadamer 
himself. Indeed, it is Gadamer who draws our attention to aspects of 
Vico’s account of verstehen that anticipate such a notion of historical 
understanding. These aspects chiefly revolve around the importance of 
common sense and rhetoric in providing (in the precise sense intended 
by Martin Heidegger) an ontological; viz., pre-methodological, ground-
ing for mutual understanding (Gadamer 1993, 19-24). In Gadamer’s 
opinion, Vico’s awareness of this ontological grounding is manifested 
in his belief that practical judgment (Aristotelian phronesis) is rooted 
in a pre-rational common sense, or intuitive certainty of what is just and 
good, that is conditioned by both acculturation in shared tradition and 
the unique circumstances of the agent’s situation; and it is precisely this 
mode of historical being that calls forth a dialogical interplay between 
tradition and the agent’s situation.
Yet, despite anticipating a dialogical model of verstehen in his dis-
cussion of common sense and rhetoric, Vico did end up embracing a 
more historicist interpretation one. As Gadamer notes, in explaining 
3	 Although Berlin notes that Vico “does not account for our knowledge of 
other selves—individual or collective, living or dead—by invoking the language 
of empathy, or analogical reasoning, or intuition or participation in the unity of 
the World Spirit” (Berlin 1976, 27), he elsewhere notes that Johann Gottfried 
Herder’s description of the historical sense with “sympathetic insight – one’s 
capacity for einfühlen (‘empathy’) … bears an uncanny resemblance to that of 
Vico” (187).
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how historical understanding is possible, Vico conceives the relation-
ship between agent and history along the model of technical making 
(Aristotelian techne). In Gadamer’s opinion, this mistaken view about 
the relationship between the agent and his historical “substance” com-
mits Vico to a kind of subjective idealism; the historian is understood 
as methodically re-creating a past she has already created, simply in 
virtue of participating in one and the same universal history-creating 
humanity. Thus, for Vico as for Dilthey, verstehen designates not an 
ontological mode of human existing underlying all knowledge and 
action whatsoever, but a distinct type of historical knowing that still 
retains a vestigial link to rational, Cartesian methodology (Gadamer 
1993, 230, 276, 373, 572).4
Can we then not say that Vico is proposing an anti-Cartesian ac-
count of historical knowledge? Yes and no. Berlin’s view that Vico’s 
account implies empathetic identification correctly identifies one aspect 
of a complex ontological (dialectical) and methodological account of 
verstehen, namely the importance of fantasy (imagination) in creating 
analogies (“correspondences”) between what are otherwise dissimilar 
worldviews and, more important, between human history and natural 
process (Berlin 1976, 73).5 He is also right in noting that one such 
analogy links the “modifications” of our own minds as we grow from 
childhood to maturity to the “modifications” of the human spirit as it 
grows from childlike barbarity to rational civility (45). Following Max 
Fisch (Vico 1968, A4, xxiii), I would go even further in arguing that 
Vico’s historical hermeneutics appeals to a structural analogy between 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development that anticipates the “herme-
neutics of suspicion” advocated by Jürgen Habermas.
This evolutionary scheme is clearly beholden to rational insight and 
generalizing method, and indeed supports the view that reason is the 
crowning achievement of human evolution. At the same time, there are 
ontological aspects of Vico’s critical hermeneutics that qualify his belief 
4	 The view I am defending here—that Vico’s rejection of Cartesian (or analytic) 
rationality does not entail a rejection of rational methodology as such—has 
recently been defended by Leon Pompa. I differ from Pompa, however, in 
arguing that, for Vico, the kind of rational methodology intrinsic to historical 
knowledge is continuous with the non-analytic (or synthetic) logic of poetic 
imagination, which is pre-rational in its origins. Cf. Pompa 1990. 
5	 For a good discussion of the importance of rhetoric, judgment, imagination, 
and analogical reasoning in Vico’s new science, see Schaeffer 1990. 
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in the progressive nature of this development. Although Vico intends 
to unmask the ideological misapprehension that worships the past 
and extols the timeless authority of tradition—a conservative bias that 
Habermas and other critical theorists ascribe to Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics—he also intends to unmask the unreasonable pretensions 
of any critical reason that aspires to replace traditional authority.
On one hand, he clearly believes that particular religions, institu-
tions, and traditions are not timeless instantiations of eternal verities, 
but are human fictions that reflect the historically conditioned biases 
of particular types of human beings and of the particular political and 
economic classes to which they belong. Only in the last stage of social 
evolution, what Vico calls the Age of Men, can it be said that such re-
ligions, institutions, and traditions take on a rational form that favors 
everyone’s universal interests equally and impartially. On the other 
hand—anticipating  Rousseau, Nietzsche, and Weber—Vico holds that 
too much civilization produces moral decay. By demanding that every 
belief  be analyzable into clear and distinct ideas possessing demonstrable 
certainty, hyperbolic reason undermines faith in traditional authority. 
Subsequent skepticism regarding the intrinsic worth of moral values 
encourages an instrumental rationalism oriented exclusively toward the 
efficient pursuit of individual self-interest, the egoism of which dissolves 
society into that “war of all against all” so famously depicted by Hobbes. 
As noted above, Vico’s own construal of history as a Promethean act 
of instrumental self-creation does not entirely escape this “dialectic of 
enlightenment,” as Adorno and Horkheimer famously dubbed it. To the 
extent that it does, however, Vichean hermeneutics endeavors to show 
how even rational criticism must accept certain traditional authorities 
unquestioningly, on faith.
Vico principally has in mind faith in divine providence (that everything 
historical can be seen as fulfilling a higher meaning and purpose). Of 
course, for modern-day secular thinkers like myself, one might plausibly 
interpret Vico’s appeal to providence as an appeal to a logic of development 
imminent within all incipient languages and cultures whose beneficent 
effects become apparent to us from the vantage point of enlightened 
hindsight. Yet, regardless of how we understand Vichean providence, it 
is clear from Vico’s text that critical reason cannot be the highest or final 
epistemic authority (as Descartes would have it) but must itself rest on 
the timeless and eternal (and hence quasi-divine) authority of language 
and tradition (as Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics would have it). 
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For it is this background of potential meaningfulness that guides all 
forms of understanding, historical or natural scientific.
1. Vico and Cartesianism 
A convenient way to begin our examination of Vico’s new science of 
historical understanding is by recalling his famous criticism of Descartes’ 
criterion of truth and its elevation of the causal-explanatory methodol-
ogy of the physical sciences as the via regia to knowledge. In his Seventh 
Inaugural Address (1708) entitled De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione 
(‘Of The Study Methods of Our Time’), Vico had argued that physical 
science is not the demonstrable science that Descartes thought it was, 
because if it were, then we – not God - would have made the laws of 
physics. By contrast, geometry is demonstrable precisely because it is 
we who have stipulated its definitions and axioms (Vico 1965, 23).
Vico’s astonishing claim owes much to the venerable medieval doctrine 
that knowledge is “per caussas.” . For Augustine and Aquinas, God’s 
knowledge is of this sort: because He created the world, He knows its 
intrinsic purposes. Invoking the Renaissance analogy between God and 
Man, Vico attributes a similar knowledge to human beings, but only with 
regard to what they create. God—not man—is the creator of physical 
nature. Human beings, therefore, can only demonstrate how – not why 
- the laws of physics function the way they do. Experimental physics 
thus yields at best probabilistic knowledge. It is entirely different with 
geometry, since we have stipulated the conventions which define the 
operations and meanings of mathematical entities. 
Two years later (1710), in De Antequissima, Vico announced his 
famous doctrine that “the true and the made are convertible” (verum et 
factum convertuntur). However, he had not yet established—as Hobbes 
in fact had already done—that demonstrable knowledge can be applied 
to the real (human) world. Geometry did not apply to this world, in his 
opinion, since it only articulated distinctions fabricated by the human 
mind that are valid, stricto sensu, only in the inner world of ideas. Phys-
ics remained the most reliable “knowledge” of the real world, which in 
his opinion was highly fallible, albeit not as fallible as history. Having 
not attained the level of nomothetic explanation, history amounted to 
little more than what (as he put it in his Third Inaugural Lecture of 
1702) “a potter, a cook, a cobbler, a summoner, an auctioneer in Rome” 
might provide a philologist studying Roman artifacts (Vico 1911, 35 
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ff.). This dismissive attitude toward history as an arbitrary collection 
of particular facts—so reminiscent of Descartes’ remark that historians 
of Rome know little more than Cicero’s servant girl—would later be 
abandoned by Vico in 1712. However, by now he had already jettisoned 
the Cartesian criterion of truth, based on the perception of clear and 
distinct ideas, as being too subjective and prone to error. More important, 
he had begun to elevate common sense certainty (il certo) of the world 
as directly lived and experienced by people in their everyday practical 
lives to a level of knowledge beyond the mere subjective opinion to 
which Descartes had apparently consigned it. 
Elaborating the radical change in Vico’s thinking announced in the 
Diritto Universale (1720), the first edition of Vico’s Scienza Nuova 
(1725) recombines these ideas in startling fashion. Historical science is 
now elevated above deductive knowledge of the mathematical type and 
inductive knowledge of the natural scientific type. In essence, historical 
knowledge combines the virtues of these separate modes of knowledge 
without their attendant defects. Like mathematical knowledge, his-
torical knowledge is about something human beings have made – the 
languages, institutions, and actions that make up social reality – and 
hence can be known per caussas and with a degree of certainty aspiring 
to demonstrable truth. Like natural scientific knowledge, it is about a 
factual reality that transcends subjective experience and mere conceptual 
analysis. To cite Vico:
As geometry, when it constructs the world of quantity out of its 
elements, or contemplates that world, is creating it for itself, just so 
does our Science [create for itself the world of nations], but with a 
reality greater by so much as the institutions having to do with hu-
man affairs are more real than points, lines surfaces, and figures are 
(Vico 1968, par. 349).
In short, because we ourselves have injected our own purposes into the 
stuff of history, and because even what we have unintentionally created 
in history—languages, customs, traditions, etc.—is meaningful to us 
from within our own mental and spiritual life—we can understand 
history as something intrinsically intelligible in a way that we cannot 
understand physical nature. To paraphrase Berlin, I may have some 
knowledge of how trees and ants look and behave based upon external 
observation, but I cannot know what it means to be them in the same 
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way I know—from the inside, as it were—what it means to be a human 
being (Berlin 1976, 23). 
2. The Possibility of Historical Understanding:
Combining Philosophical Reason and 
Aesthetic Imagination in the New Science 
What is this new kind of historical self-knowledge that Vico is sup-
posedly proposing? Berlin thinks he has an answer. Referring Vichean 
reflissione (self-knowledge) to the operations of fantasia (imagination), 
he submits that the kind of “imaginative reconstruction” characteristic 
of Vico’s conception of historical understanding amounts to a kind of 
mental transposition into and identification with the otherwise alien 
worldviews of past epochs. In short, like later historicists in the German 
Romantic school, Vico is said to believe that present and past epochs are 
radically incommensurable, incomparable, and even untranslatable—so 
much so that Vico would vehemently deny Leonardo Bruni’s claim, so 
typical of Renaissance humanism, that “Nothing is said in Greek that 
cannot be said in Latin” (Berlin 1976, 139). 
Why attribute to Vico such an extreme—and implausible—view 
of incommensurability? The view is patently self-defeating, since one 
would have had to translate Greek and Latin into one’s own language 
in order to know that they were incommensurable (untranslatable), 
thereby rendering them commensurable (Davidson 1984). Berlin 
himself offers scant evidence to show that Vico actually believed that 
cultural worldviews were this incommensurable. Vico’s adamant refusal 
to accept the notion of a timeless human nature replete with a timeless 
natural law to govern it is not evidence that he held this radical view. 
For the New Science is very much written from the standpoint of a jurist 
who did believe in a natural law common to all peoples—albeit a law 
of historical evolution. To understand the present as an outgrowth of 
the past amounts to understanding the past as an anticipation of the 
present. This way of translating the mente of the past into the mente 
of the present preserves rather than obliterates the difference between 
past and present. The natural law theorists of Vico’s day, however, did 
not translate the past into the present: rather, they simply projected the 
present onto the past. To cite Vico:
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The three princes of this doctrine [of natural law—D.I.], Hugo 
Grotius, John Selden, and Samuel Pufendorf, should have taken their 
start from the beginnings of the gentes, where their subject matter 
begins. But all three of them err together in this respect, by beginning 
in the middle; that is, with the latest times of the civilized nations 
(and thus with men enlightened by fully natural reason), from which 
the philosophers emerged and rose to meditation of a perfect idea of 
justice (Vico 1968, par. 394). 
In contrast to the static notion of human nature appealed to by the 
natural law doctrines of his time, Vico’s “natural law of gentes” rests 
upon a dynamic conception of human nature and of human nations 
(gentes). Both terms—natura and genti (the Italian plural of gente, 
whose Latin roots are gens and the plural nominative gentes)—refer 
to birth (natio/(nascimento) and genesis, or growth and development 
(Vico 1968, par. 147).
By ‘nation’ Vico means a distinctive group of people who descend from 
common institutional origins peculiar to themselves, viz., institutions 
that are not shared by others and which develop according to an internal 
logic impelled mainly by internal class struggles. Vico himself restricts 
his study to the “gentile” nations for whom, unlike the Jews, the truth of 
God’s providence was not revealed once and for all and who must there-
fore historically evolve toward this ideal state without ever completely 
attaining it (Vico 1968, par. 167, 365). The descendants of Ham and 
Japheth and the non-Hebraic descendants of Shem are described by 
Vico as having lost all language and civil institution and being reduced 
to utter bestiality (par. 369). The rebirth of these giant bestioni and ferini 
into a nation—or rather, “un mondo delle nazioni”—begins with their 
providential discovery of matrimonial and religious institutions. From 
that point on, each nation runs though three successive ages, or stages 
of natural genesis: that of Gods, that of heroes, and that of men. Only 
in the last age do human beings approximately achieve (for however 
fleeting a moment) the “rational humanity” that is “the true and proper 
nature of man” (par. 973), namely of “human reason fully developed” and 
reconciled to faith (par. 326, 924). Because this end is an ideal that is 
never completely achieved, the natural (although perhaps not inevitable) 
fate of most nations is dissolution and return to state of barbarism, 
whence the cycle of ages begins anew, albeit at a higher level.6 
6	 Vico believes that, following the flourishing of enlightenment during 
late antiquity and continuing through the fall of the Roman Empire, a new 
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 Vico’s pointed reference to a “natural law of gentes” common to all gen-
tile peoples thus refers primarily to the fact that all peoples run through 
one and the same universal course of historical evolution and that all 
peoples, regardless of their peculiar differences, preserve and maintain 
themselves through institutions of marriage, burial, and religion (Vico 
1968, par. 332-33). The important point to note in this adumbration 
is that, according to Vico, these universals of human society did not 
emerge through cultural diffusion or communication between different 
peoples, since the latter are “separately founded because remote from each 
other in time and space” (par. 332-33). Therefore, “the common ground 
of truth” underlying “uniform ideas originating among entire peoples 
unknown to each other” (par. 144) must be divine providence. 
 I will have more to say below about the importance of providence in 
Vico’s new science. Presently it suffices to note the severity of the problem 
Vico has set for himself. Different nations may share a common natural 
law of development, but such a common ground of understanding will 
not aid in understanding earlier stages of human understanding that 
are so radically different from our enlightened nature. As Vico himself 
puts it: 
To discover the way in which this first human thinking arose in the 
gentile world, we encountered exasperating difficulties which have 
cost us the research of a good twenty years. [We had] to descend 
from these human and refined natures of ours to those quite wild and 
savage natures, which we cannot at all imagine and can comprehend 
with only great effort (par. 338).
In the passage cited above, Vico affirms that pre-civilized ways of under-
standing can be understood—the new science is proof of this—albeit 
with great difficulty. This affirmation alone suffices to rebut the incom-
mensurability thesis attributed to him by Berlin. Still, the problem 
remains how radically different ways of understanding can be made 
commensurable from the vantage point of the historian. The key to 
bridging this gap—and the key to understanding what kind of historical 
understanding Vico may have had in mind—resides in his belief that 
Christian era inaugurates the cycle of ages once more. Unlike its Egyptian and 
Greco-Roman precursors, this ricorso of historical development begins with a 
barbarism (the Dark Ages) that inherits a superior poetic wisdom, in that the 
God it worships is more human and morally superior than the pagan Gods 
of antiquity. 
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all modern languages (viz., rationalized prose languages whose clear 
and distinct conceptual distinctions between words facilitate useful 
communication) contain residues of their poetic past: “We find that the 
principles of these origins both of languages and of letters lie in the fact 
that the early gentile peoples, by a demonstrated necessity of nature, 
were poets who spoke in poetic characters” (par. 34).
The poetic wisdom of the divine and heroic ages of humanity con-
sisted of creating the symbols (at first hieroglyphics) and metaphors 
out of which human institutions and social relationships are created. In 
Vico’s opinion, these symbols and images worked through a logic that 
bore some resemblance to what Aristotle called the ars topica, the art 
of hitting upon common places (topoi), or analogies for fashioning the 
most rhetorically convincing (i.e., probable) explanation for some fact. 
Rather than using cause and effect to explain things, primitive human 
beings used resemblance. Things that belonged together by resemblance 
also had magical affinities with respect to their properties that could be 
used to explain their behavior. 
For Vico, primitive humans rely upon a kind of “corporeal imagina-
tion” to invent “sensory topics,” or “imaginative universals.” Such humans 
naturally take what is most familiar to themselves—their own bodies 
and its feelings—as a reference point for inventing fables about nature, 
whose properties seem to resemble the properties of human action. To 
illustrate such anthropomorphizing: Vico notes how startling sounds 
such as thunder would be construed “in the first place” as a human-like 
grumble or shout—the voice of the sky but also of God, or Jove (Vico 
1968, par. 377). The fright and subsequent flight to cave shelters—the 
origination of all settled, civilized life, according to Vico—was the first 
instinctual reflex of a mortal fear of God. Thus was born religion. By 
further analogical reasoning these early cave dwellers later interpreted 
the fact of settled life as something divinely sanctioned. Here begins 
the genesis of an heroic ethos that would explicitly link settled property 
with noble, divine-like authority and power. Presuming themselves to 
be descended from the Gods and the first race of mortal heroes, these 
nobles imagined themselves to be—their mortality in this world not-
withstanding—as divine-like and immortal as the eternal and unchang-
ing natural deities governing them. Hence they would naturally seek to 
guarantee their eternal patrimony through marriage laws establishing 
patrilineal descent. Likewise, they would establish burial laws and rites 
as further proof of their immortality. 
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Thus, Vico concludes that it is through a poetic logic of metaphorical 
association—not through an analytic logic of abstract reasoning—that 
the three fundamental institutions of religion, marriage, and burial that 
ground the possibility of law, morality, and society are instituted. As 
he notes, heroic emblems attest to this primitive amalgamation by ana-
logically condensing religion, property, and legal authority into a single 
symbol or metaphor. The heraldic device of an oak tree, for instance, 
refers to noble descent (symbolized by fixed roots), settled property 
(symbolized by the shelter of a forest canopy), religion (symbolized 
by the binding together, or religio, of branches around a single trunk), 
and law (symbolized by an acorn, whose archaic Latin root is related 
to both God and law, or ius). 
 To return to our original query, the problem of historical understanding 
amounts to bridging the gap separating the modern historian’s rational 
understanding, which is informed by the clear conceptual distinctions 
operant within ordinary speech, from the primitive agent’s poetic un-
derstanding, which is informed by the collapsing of such distinctions 
necessary for creating original classifications and linkages based on 
superficial resemblances. In the New Science, philology provides one 
condition for bridging this gap, philosophy the other.
Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the 
true; philology observes that of which human choice is the author, 
whence comes consciousness of the certain. This axiom by its second 
part includes among the philologians all the grammarians, historians, 
critics, who have occupied themselves with the study of the languages 
and the deeds of peoples: deeds at home, as in their customs and laws, 
and deeds abroad, as in their wars, peaces, alliances, travels, com-
merce. This same axiom shows how the philosophers failed by half 
in not giving certainty to their reasonings by appeal to the authority 
of the philologians, and likewise how the latter failed by half by not 
taking care to give their authority the sanction of truth by appeal to 
the reasonings of the philosophers (Vico 1968, par. 138-40).
According to Vico, philology is a branch of coscienza, conscious ex-
perience and understanding of particular facts, including facts about 
particular historical human beings and their particular societies. Cosci-
enza is capable of achieving certainty (il certo), either by the direct and 
unquestioned sensory experience of physical nature or by the direct and 
unquestioned understanding of language and other institutions. This 
is what Vico means by common sense (sensus communis) or “judgment 
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without reflection.” Here is where Vico draws his important distinction 
between two types of common sense: inner and outer. Again, although 
we can be said to have direct and indubitable sensory experience of 
physical nature—however rationally fallible it might be—it is, for Vico, 
of a different kind than the direct and indubitable understanding we 
have of the language and institutions that constitute our lives “from the 
inside.” Indeed, if our common sense understanding of language and 
life can never aspire to the kind of rationally demonstrable certainty 
and universal truth that Vico associates with that other human sci-
ence—geometry—it is nonetheless capable of achieving a certainty and 
demonstrability greater than that of physics.
Although Vico speaks of common sense as providing the kind of 
pre-reflective certitude philologists can claim for their findings, he 
elsewhere (as noted above) asserts that common sense qua common 
designates a kind of universal understanding that lies at the origin of all 
languages, no matter how different they are from one another. In this 
respect, philology can aid philosophy in its search for universal truths 
and, more important, can aid historical understanding by revealing a 
“common language” bridging what are otherwise radically distinct na-
tions and epics.
There must in the nature of human institutions be a mental language 
common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things 
feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse 
modifications as these same things have diverse aspects. A proof of 
this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which 
substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as 
there are nations ancient and modern. This common mental language 
is proper to our Science, by whose light linguistic scholars will be 
enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the various 
articulate languages living and dead (par.161).
Clearly, philology is able to construct a common language bridging 
modern (conceptual) and ancient (poetic) languages because the former 
contains traces of the latter in its own etymology. Today’s dead meta-
phors were yesterday’s living metaphors and as such reveal something 
about the lives and institutions of earlier humans (par. 152). Indeed, 
according to Vico, today’s clear and distinct ideas merely condense 
yesterday’s metaphors: 
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Take for example, “the blood boils in my heart,” based on a property 
natural, eternal, and common to all mankind. They took the blood, 
the boiling, and the heart, and then made of them a single word, as 
it were, a genus, called in Greek stomachos, in Latin ira, and in Italian 
collera (par. 460).
Although philology goes far toward bridging the gap between present 
and past, it cannot succeed alone in this endeavor. Philosophy is needed 
to provide direct and rational insight into the universal laws governing 
the evolution from past to present implicit in the corsi run by all nations. 
How it accomplishes this is far from clear. Vico mentions that philoso-
phers sometimes cognize universals by means of abstracting common 
properties from a comparison of particulars. Thus, he notes that before 
the Athenians enacted their laws they came to agreement independently 
about their utility, which agreement was then adumbrated by Socrates 
“by induction” in the form of “collecting uniform particulars which go 
to make up” “intelligible genera or abstract universals” (Vico 1968, par., 
1040). In his introductory commentary to the third edition of the New 
Science, Max Fisch also seems to imply that this is how philosophical 
reason supplements philology (Fisch, 1744, xxx). However, as Berlin 
rightly notes, that couldn’t be the whole story, since induction based on 
observed similarities yields at best probabilistic “knowledge” of how things 
happen and not the demonstrable understanding of why things must 
happen that Vico claims for his historical science (Berlin 1976, 83).
 Vico must therefore be understood as saying that philosophical reason 
takes up the “certain” findings of philological understanding and the 
less certain probabilistic findings of comparative history in rationally 
intuiting the universal stages of historical development. Just how this 
is possible—if God and not humanity is the creator of these natural 
laws—is unclear. As Habermas notes, Vico denies that historical agents 
make history with the same degree of transparent consciousness that 
God (for whom conceiving is creating) makes nature, here understood 
to include human nature and its historical laws. Like Hegel’s cunning 
of reason (List der Vernunft), Vico’s God makes historical agents ac-
complish higher ends without their conscious consent and participation. 
Furthermore, Vico’s cyclical understanding of historical laws conforms 
more closely to the pagan view of “naturalized” history than to the 
Christian (or salvationist) view traditionally associated with the idea of 
providence. Since history does not progress in any straightforward linear 
manner, it is difficult for Vico to sustain that history as such reveals a 
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clear and certain, rational pattern (or logic) of providential lawfulness 
(Habermas 1973, 244-247). 
The last problem may indeed be insuperable. However, if we leave aside 
the problem of cyclical ricorsi and focus exclusively on the laws governing 
historical corsi, which do reveal a progressive development, a solution 
to the first problem may be at hand. Anticipating the absolute idealism 
of Hegel, Vico may have believed that human beings could participate 
directly in the divine mind. This idea seems less far-fetched when we 
recall that, for Vico, humans create religion—and God—in their own 
image (Vico 1968, par. 367). Like Hegel, Vico might then be understood 
as equating God with the human spirit, so that the providential corsi 
run by all nations would be a human creation fully knowable by them. 
Knowing themselves as historical beings would then be tantamount to 
knowing the self-actualization of God in history.
Such an intriguing solution to the problem of universal historical 
knowledge transcends the scope of our epistemological inquiry, which 
is focused on the possibility of a more mundane solution. One solu-
tion, alluded to earlier, appeals to the fact that analytical reason builds 
upon and incorporates the accomplishments of poetic wisdom. Just as 
Immanuel Kant would later argue that analytic reason (abstraction and 
induction) already presupposes synthetic (transcendental) reason, which 
deploys the schematism of the imagination to unify discrete sensory 
qualia into image-types (or schemas), so Vico argues that abstracting 
universal laws presupposes analogical reasoning, which creates imagi-
native universals. Following yet another clue suggested by Kant, such 
analogical reasoning can be compared to a kind of reflective judgment, 
which discovers universals (or types, such as “the beautiful”) based upon 
feelings and intuitions associated with particulars.7 
Drawing from an example that is closer to Vico’s own experience 
as a jurist, judges defer to reflective judgment whenever they seek to 
discover the proper rule under which to subsume cases that are suscep-
tible to conflicting interpretations. Cases that are especially recalcitrant 
to subsumption under given laws may call forth an additional act of 
reflective judgment in which the laws themselves are reinterpreted. A 
case in point is the right to privacy in American jurisprudence. This 
7	 Kant’s examination of the amphibolies of reflection in the First Critique 
and his account of reflective judgment in the Third Critique further extend his 
treatment of synthetic reason. For discussion of this aspect of Kant’s thought 
see Ingram 1985 and 1988.
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right was created (or “discovered”) in the landmark case Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965) by a process of analogical reasoning, in which the 
freedom of couples to engage in family planning (including gaining 
access to birth control) was compared to earlier constitutional rulings 
regarding freedom from invasive search and seizure, freedom of speech, 
and other “similar” cases.
The important point to bear in mind is that the analogical reasoning 
deployed by jurists implicates a kind of non-analytical reflection. When 
Vico says that historical knowledge presupposes philosophical reason, it 
might very well be this kind of aesthetic and inventive reflection he has in 
mind. Indeed, in the next section we shall see that it must be this kind 
of reflection. But in that case, at least one form of enlightened reason 
does possess an elective affinity with pre-enlightened poetic wisdom. 
Such an affinity would bridge the gap between enlightened philosophical 
understanding and poetic wisdom. And it would also confirm one of the 
central tenets of philosophical hermeneutics as Gadamer understands 
it. For Gadamer, Vico’s major contribution resides less in espousing a 
method of historical understanding than in preserving an ontological 
truth about human being in general: that the basis of practical reason 
(what Aristotle calls phronesis) is none other than the art of sound judg-
ment cultivated on the basis of common sense (Gadamer 1993, 19-24). 
In other words, to the extent that any act of understanding involves the 
judicious art of asking just the right questions (i.e., of applying what 
one already knows to discover what one does not already know), any 
knowledge whatsoever can be said to rest upon the re-appropriation 
of an effective history, sedimented in tradition and language. Sound 
judgment of this kind cannot be exercised through methodical analysis, 
but must be acquired through experience. 
But that cannot be all there is to historical understanding. Vico insists 
that such historical understanding also presupposes a method – or 
more precisely, knowledge of a sequential, law-like progression – that 
enables the historian to understand earlier forms of society as in some 
sense analogous to his or her own childhood. So construed, the new 
science deploys a pre-methodological form of analogical reasoning to 
discover a methodical form of explanation and understanding. For Vico 
this methodical form of understanding presupposes that social evolu-
tion (phylogenesis) replicates the stages of maturation from childhood 
(ontogenesis). Perhaps Vico believed that our lived participation in the 
natural cycle of birth, maturation, and death provided an analogue to 
Vico & the New Science of Interpretation 215
understanding the necessity of a similar cycle in the birth, maturation 
and decline of nations (Vico 1968, par. 349). He himself draws the 
analogy between childhood and poetic wisdom, on one hand, and ma-
turity and philosophical wisdom, on the other, as partial confirmation 
of his thesis (par. 186, 213, 408, 412-13, 447, 454, 498, 1032). The 
language, logic, and thought-processes of the earliest peoples—the 
“children of the human race” (par. 498)—replicate the language, logic, 
and thought-processes of childhood. Because we modern rationalists 
also passed through this stage, we can be said to have run through the 
corso that all nations run through in our own lifetime, and so can be said 
to be co-author of it to a degree that provides a modicum of historical 
knowledge per caussas.
 Establishing an analogy between phylogenesis and ontogenesis might 
indeed be necessary for a speculative philosopher seeking to articulate 
a universal history of humanity. Whether such an analogy can be sus-
tained is, of course, a matter of considerable contention on which Vico 
himself sheds very little light. Be that as it may, for our purposes the 
question about social evolution revolves around the problem of histori-
cal understanding simpliciter and not merely around the problem of 
establishing a universal course through which all nations traverse. 
 
3. The Contemporary Relevance of Vico’s 
Science of Historical Understanding
 
Before we examine the hypothesis that Vico’s historical hermeneutics 
rests upon a theory of social evolution, let us re-examine more closely 
why it cannot rest upon the historicist methodology attributed to it by 
Berlin. It is true that Vico sometimes sounds like an historicist when 
he talks about the radical gulf separating poetic from rational modes of 
understanding. The impression he gives that worldviews and modes of 
understanding are self-contained is further reinforced by his belief that 
the gentile nations developed their own peculiar common sense without 
communicating with one another (Vico 1968, par. 145). 
Historicism is Cartesian in its view that the subject and object of 
knowledge are separated by such an immense gulf that knowledge 
can only be achieved by the knower “methodically” bracketing out 
her subjectivity in an effort to conform to the object. More precisely, 
historicists endeavor to bring about a true correspondence with their 
object by critically checking the effects of their own worldview, as these 
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are shaped by language and culture. In their opinion, once the historian 
has cleared her head of all contemporary prejudices, she will be in a 
position to sympathetically enter into the mind of her subject. If this 
seems impossible, she can by-pass the deep, substantive differences she 
finds incomprehensible in her subject and, like a natural scientist using 
the inductive method, focus on the superficial formal resemblances 
between it and her own worldview.
In that case, historical science would be imitating natural science. 
This model of historical science, famously defended in the last century 
by Karl Popper and Carl Hempel, is deeply problematic for reasons we 
have already adduced. The universal laws that a naturalized historical 
science discovers through a comparative analysis of particular historical 
events will be useless in understanding why particular events had to 
happen the way they did. Explanations of particular historical events by 
appeal to general laws will never succeed because it is precisely the par-
ticular circumstances surrounding them—and above all, the particular 
purposes of the agents who made them—that enable us to understand 
why they had to happen the way they did. Stated differently, subsum-
ing a particular event under a general covering law provides something 
less than a genuine causal explanation of the event, and really amounts 
to showing nothing more than how it resembles other events. In his 
own way, Vico seems to have already anticipated this objection to the 
covering-law method of historical explanation in his insistence that a 
true historical cause must refer to a meaningful purpose of an agent, 
be it human or superhuman. 
 In sum, although Vico often appeals to the comparative method in 
defending the universal patterns common to all nations at a certain 
stage of development (Vico 1968, par. 344-45), he cannot consistently 
hold that this “abstract” knowledge is the true knowledge afforded by 
his new science. Doing so would contradict his epistemological axiom 
that true knowledge explains why things happen per caussas, which is 
possible only because the knower has in some sense meaningfully and 
intentionally participated in the creation of what she knows. The use 
of observable associations between discrete types of events manifesting 
a certain stochastic frequency, as David Hume rightly noted, cannot 
explain, with the kind of “demonstrable necessity” Vico demands of 
his science, why one nation passes from one stage of social evolution to 
another. Such historical necessity, Vico says, must rather be understood 
in the first place as internally caused by the freely willed intentions of 
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human beings and, in the second place, by the unintended consequences 
of such intentional acts. Such consequences must in turn be understood 
as serving higher ends vis-à-vis the meaningful realization of institu-
tions that are in turn logically necessary for the meaningful realization 
of a fully human—and rational—way of life. In the last instance, this 
amounts to showing how one stage of understanding logically implies 
and irreversibly builds upon its predecessor—a kind of teleology that 
Vico attributes to “divine providence.” 
 If the model of understanding appealed to by Vico is not the me-
thodical suspension of subjective biases and imaginative identification 
described by historicists, then what is it? As we have seen, Vico’s treat-
ment of the connection between common sense, rhetoric, and judgment 
suggests that the kind of historical understanding he has in mind is 
closer to the pre-methodological, ontological understanding articulated 
by Heideggerians like Gadamer. According to Gadamer, we can never 
methodically rise above the parochial languages and traditions that have 
shaped our understanding because, as Vico well understood, they form 
the certain (if conceptually pre-reflective) common sense background to 
all understanding. However, saying that understanding is conditioned 
by the present does not prevent us from understanding the archaic past 
(or for that matter, other cultures). For the present and past are held 
together by a common and continuous culture whose changes in the 
course of historical reinterpretation work to preserve its authority; and 
even widely diverse cultures share a potential for mutual understanding 
(what Gadamer calls the speculative dimension of language) based on 
something analogous to Vico’s pre-reflective common sense (Vico 1968, 
par. 356).
Vico warns us that historians must be careful not to “project” uncriti-
cally their “modern” and “enlightened” assumptions onto their archaic 
subjects. But self-critical understanding need not—and as we have seen, 
cannot—involve the wholesale bracketing of cultural and linguistic 
prejudices. Rather, since we must engage our parochial prejudices in 
understanding—they are, after all, the only familiar reference points 
we have for interrogating the world around us—we must engage them 
with the subject matter of the archaic text itself, in the form of simulated 
dialogue involving mutual questioning. Here understanding will be 
oriented toward a kind of agreement or mutual understanding, in which 
the original meaning of the archaic text is nonetheless reinterpreted—or 
rephrased—within the familiar language of the historian. So construed, 
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historical interpretation will not be merely reproductive—preserving 
the truth of tradition in some timeless and unchanging form—but will 
also be poetic and creative.
 As noted above, there are many indications within Vico’s text that 
suggest that he shares the basic tenets of this philosophical hermeneutics. 
To begin with, he embraces the fact that poetic language creates and 
constitutes all meaning and identity, and so provides the Ursprung from 
which reason itself springs (Vico 1968, par. 362). Too, he thinks we can 
communicate with the past from the standpoint of the present—and 
learn from it. This communication is implicitly dialogical, since Vico 
believes that enlightened historical understanding can learn to appreci-
ate the basic truth embedded in cultural tradition, namely that reason 
itself rests upon a providential authority that transcends its powers of 
analysis and clarification.
However, it would seem that Vico’s new science goes beyond philo-
sophical hermeneutics in several important respects. First, it does not 
vest particular traditional beliefs with a timeless claim to authority and 
wisdom. On the contrary, it unmasks their ideological pretensions by 
showing that they originate in ignorance (Vico 1968, par. 375) and 
class domination. Such ideological justifications of domination may be 
necessary in early stages of human evolution, but they are deceptions 
nonetheless—falsehoods concealing the rational truth implicit in Chris-
tian humanism (par. 375). Second, the new science is able to do this 
partly because it appeals to a view of historical evolution that sees the 
rational age of men—the Cartesian age of clear and distinct ideas—as 
a secular instantiation of Christian humanism, which articulates the 
universal equality and freedom of all (reasonable) men as having been 
made in the image of God. Finally, because the new science is itself a 
product of this age, it must incorporate within its mode of historical 
understanding the critical methods of philosophical science that enable 
it to expose the deceptions of earlier ages. 
 
4. Between Critical and Redemptive Hermeneutics:
Vichean Science as Humanistic Praxis and
Theological Consolation
What critical methods did Vico have in mind? They could not be the 
methods of conceptual analysis proposed by Descartes, since these 
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require abstracting from historical understanding. Nonetheless, there 
is something vaguely Cartesian about Vico’s description of historical 
methods. These methods involve rendering “clear and distinct” (par. 
390) certain “modifications of the mind” (par. 349) that are objectified 
in the historical traces of our own language. Vichean science begins by 
analyzing the rich data of history (through “a severe analysis of human 
thoughts”[par. 347]), in order to uncover certain universal and unques-
tioned principles—principles, to be sure, whose certainty is guaranteed 
not by pure reason demanding indubitable certainty but rather by a kind 
of pre-reflective common sense establishing what is beyond question. 
With a kind of geometrical rigor, it deduces from these principles—of 
religion, marriage, and burial—something like a necessary and universal 
sequence of developmental stages, or what he elsewhere calls a “history 
of ideas” (par. 347). This history, in turn, enables the new science to 
prove the rational superiority of Christian humanism in comparison 
to pre-rational religion (early Christianity included), which justifies 
hierarchy and inequality.
 Vico’s “hermeneutics of suspicion”—the unmasking of ideology as 
subterfuge for class domination—proceeds by linking the understand-
ing of meanings to the explanation of causes. The historical agent’s 
purposes that lend action meaning produce both intended and unin-
tended effects, and so are causes in this sense. However, such purposes 
have concealed within them ulterior meanings and aims that are not 
intended—indeed, are not even known—by the agent. The religious 
myths that validate the heroic natural law that “might makes right” are 
really an expression of a particular human caste system and not a true 
depiction of divinity. But this deeper meaning is concealed from both 
the powerful who invoke the law to advance their ends as well as from 
the weak who submit to it in violation of their ends. Likewise, the fact 
that such a caste system and its corresponding ideological form repre-
sent a necessary stage in human evolution is also concealed from them. 
These two sets of deeper meanings—the genesis of natural law out of 
contingent systems of human domination and the genesis of a stage of 
social evolution according to a necessary logic—act to compel human 
action in some causally necessary way. 
Scholars such as Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas have convincingly 
argued that the kind of hermeneutics of suspicion that I have attributed 
to Vico’s new science can be compared to psychoanalytic interpretation.8 
8	 See Ricoeur 1970 and Habermas 1971. 
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Like Freudian psychoanalysis, Vichean science approaches its subject 
matter with suspicion: the literal or surface meaning of a neurotic episode 
or social ideology is misunderstood or not understood at all by the agent, 
so that what she thinks she is doing does not correspond to what she is 
really doing. Her behavior therefore bears the trace of an unconscious 
motivation that “compels” her to behave in mysterious ways.
It bears repeating that this is precisely the kind of concealed purpose 
that, according to Vico, causally compels historical agents to bring 
about—against their own free will—the higher purposes ordained by 
Providence and the developmental logic implicit in the idea of human-
ity. In this sense, historical agents both are and are not the agents of 
history. They become fully agents only after they understand the deeper 
humanity animating their own behavior. The New Science aids in this 
endeavor in two ways. First, it vindicates religion, moral moderation, 
and faith in the immortality of the soul by showing that they are the 
certain and unquestionable presuppositions underlying any form of 
human life. Second, it shows how the achievement of rational human-
ism—indeed, the very science that criticizes unquestioned presupposi-
tions—necessarily unfolds out of these very same taken-for-granted, 
commonsense institutions.
But of course the new science is more than just “rational theology.” It is 
rational theology used to unmask ideology. Just as psychoanalysis depends 
upon a (mythic) theory of ontogenetic (psycho-sexual) development in 
order to explain how the agent’s neurotic episodes can be understood 
in terms of a failed attempt at resolving crises that necessarily unfold 
within the hidden drama of sexual maturation, so too Vichean history 
depends upon a theory of social evolution to explain how society’s 
ideological compulsions can be understood in terms of failed attempts 
at being fully human – or fully adult. Habermas (following Alfred 
Lorenzer) has shown how such compulsions can be understood in 
terms of a model of “distorted communication” (Habermas 1971, 256). 
Neurotic behavior is a “symbolic” re-enactment of a childhood trauma 
written in the paleo-symbolic code of the unconscious in which distinct 
persons, things, and events from childhood are “poetically” condensed 
or displaced through use of metonym, synecdoche, or metaphor. One 
must have an understanding of this language—and the various mani-
festations it assumes in the course of psycho-sexual development—to 
decipher the hidden meaning of the neurotic’s behavior, which is both 
repetition of and fixation on an earlier infantile stage of development. 
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Once this meaning is revealed to the neurotic, her behavior ceases to 
be compelled by the logic of blind causality and can be rationally and 
freely controlled. 
A similar kind of distorted communication seems to explain ideo-
logically rigidified behavior. The mechanical enactment of destructive 
(masochistic and sadistic) behavior—for instance, the regression of 
supposedly enlightened individuals into a fascist movement—can be 
explained in terms of the hypnotic effect that pre-rational propaganda 
has on the average mind. Fascist propaganda is similar to those “mute” 
mytho-poetic (hieroglyphic) languages spoken by priests and children. 
These languages, too, condense feeling and thought; play upon sublimi-
nal, unconscious associations between sexual desire and violence; and 
deliberately conflate fantasy with fact, fact with norm, and norm with 
personal charisma, in such a way as to resist rational questioning. As 
Vico notes, such languages are more like divine incantations—or ritu-
als—than meaningful utterances containing clear referential (factual) 
meanings and interactive intentions.
Vico’s intriguing idea that each stage of social evolution possesses its 
own distinctive level of linguistic, logical, and cognitive-moral develop-
ment remarkably anticipates well-known theories of child development 
advanced by Jean Piaget and, more recently, Habermas. According to 
Habermas, the process of cultural and societal rationalization that ac-
companies social evolution can be understood as a process of “linguis-
tification” whereby primitive, mythopoetic modes of language use are 
gradually supplanted by more prosaic and utilitarian forms of rational 
communication (Habermas 1984, 67-69, 72 ff.; 1984, 3-111). This has 
important implications for Habermas’s approach to ideology critique. 
Whereas early “poetic” modes of linguistic usage collapse distinctions 
between facts, values, and personal expressions/fantasies—a syndrome 
that still survives in early modern conceptions of natural, divine-com-
mand theories of natural law—modern “prosaic” communication 
separates them out according to their own irreducibly distinct logics. 
Because scientific-descriptive, legal-moral, and aesthetic-expressive 
utterances are now treated as if they were logically distinct from one 
another, they are uniquely susceptible to criticism by appeal to “clear 
and distinct” standards of evidence (Habermas 1987, 188-97). 
 The centrality of clear and distinct standards of evidence to rational 
critique returns us to our original theme: the manner in which Vichean 
science both is and is not Cartesian. As we have seen, even the herme-
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neutics of suspicion must stop short of demanding absolute clarity and 
indubitable certainty with respect to its subject matter. Ideology critique 
can never aspire to complete transparent understanding of historical 
meaning because even it must take for granted some unquestioned 
presuppositions. Furthermore, when pure reason becomes uncritical of 
its own hyperbolic pretensions—demanding absolute justification for 
every conceivable authority—we descend into a kind of Jacobin Terror 
in which all culture becomes suspect. Such “barbarism of reflection,” 
as Vico refers to it, is irrational because it is contrary to what any self-
critical reason could reasonably demand. 
 In sum, critical reason becomes “redemptive” at the point in which 
it becomes self-evident that meaning arises out of a pre-rational act of 
poetic imagination.9 For theologically inspired critical theorists like 
Vico and Walter Benjamin, language represents a sedimentation of 
anonymous, meaning-creating syntheses that can never be replicated by 
human beings acting rationally and deliberatively. The rhetorical power 
of modern language owes an infinite debt to a poetic past whose roots 
are essentially pre-rational. True understanding, therefore, will respect 
and preserve that past, even as it criticizes it.
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